The Dark Side of Humanitarian Aid

In Crisis Caravan, Linda Polman talks about the problems that come with aid organizations when they flood into war zones or areas in crisis. 

She starts by saying that most humanitarians in Sierra Leone providing aid were White Westerners, in sections that were nicer than any part of the country they were suppose to be helping. And that wherever aid workers go, prostitution soars

Humantarian aid community sees no problem in as she says "looking like an international jet set on holiday" (50) in countries ravaged by war and poverty. 

The rise of MONGO's or my own NGO's that are not necessarily better than established NGO's but create different problems. For example, they often send donations that are not needed or wanted to crisis zones. Tsunami victims are given things like winter coats or stiletto heels. She goes into a lot of detail about MONGO mistakes and them sending unwanted or inappropriate items to disaster areas. It is also difficult to gauge their impact because they don't do studies. 

Sometimes the public can do more harm than good. She talks about a flood in 1953 where the Red Cross asked for donations and were soon so overwhelmed with stuff that they didn't know what to do with all of it. 

She also talked about medical aid workers who come to Africa without any real training or understanding of the situation or what local diseases their are. They come in and often do more harm than good with no concern for aftercare and no checks on what they are doing because there is no medical review board in a war torn country. 

Aid often goes to the wrong people or the wrong items are donated and have no use in war torn countries. 

She says "you'd think victims in a war zone had a right of protection from aid workers who arrive unannounced and set about their work without the most basic qualifications" (62). 

Failures of MONGO's go unreported apparently because it reflects badly on international aid. But countries are often no organized enough to get them to leave. An exception was in 1995 in Rwanda when the country expelled over 50 MONGOs because they couldn't explain what they were doing. 

She starts off the "Aid as a Weapon of War" chapter by talking about how humanitarians gain access to war zones. Access to these zones is impossible to get without some sort of payment. Warlords especially try to get as much aid supplies as they can so they can get cash from it. But often it is not just the victims that need aid but also the soldiers. The UN estimates that over one third of food aid went to the Taliban in 2006. 

INGOs, MONGOs and journalists are free to make any deal with any sort of leader to gain access to war zones. But it is often difficult to negotiate when so many wannabe leaders exist. 

In some places the cost of doing aid work means paying gangs or terrorist groups. She gives the example of Caritas helping to rebuild Sri Lanka and therefore financed the Tamil Tigers because there was no other way to get the work done than to work with them and pay them off. She states quite clearly "once inside a war zone, it's essential to have a blind spot for matters of ethics" 

The Tamil Tigers are a guerrilla organization in Sri Lanka that have been labeled terrorist by many nations. 

Countries take advantage of the wealth of aid workers with humanitarian territory prices being way more than anywhere else in the country. And local leaders suddenly start driving expensive cars and building large homes. Aid organizations ultimately keep quiet about the amount of money that countries in war have extorted or stolen from them so it is hard to know how much money really goes to the wrong people. 

But those who abuse the aid system go unpunished and the value of aid keeps going up, inevitably ending up in the wrong hands and potentially funding the opposition's war. 

While she provides all this criticism she does also delve into possible solutions. Each solution, however, is different for each country and each situation. She notes that in response to negative commentary people often say that they should do nothing at all then. While this may be an option, it is probably not the best option. 

She suggests there be consequences for humanitarian mistakes. That their work be helpful and also ethical because without balance, what good are they really doing? So many aid organizations are becoming what she calls "involuntary collaborators" by funding rebel leaders and dictators in the name of "aid". 

There are no agreed upon rules or definitions in the humanitarian community let alone any system to measure how much good they are doing. Bottom line is that the aid industry needs to be controlled by another body and not themselves or nothing will change. 

She also points out that journalists are also responsible for this system. We rarely question aid organizations and automatically approve of their actions without debate or question. Journalists fail to probe into what's behind aid organizations which is why she says they are business dressed up as Mother Teresa. Since they have such "noble intent", journalists don't see the need to dig into their inner dealings. She also says that journalists often don't specialize in reporting on aid so they don't even know what to look for or what to ask. 

She ultimately recommends asking a lot of questions. Ask the aid workers where the money is going, who it is helping and whether the money is going to those who need it or people who want to extort it.